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Abstract
New information and communication technologies, we argue, have been power-
biased: they have allowed 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cing the power of these workers. An e¢ ciency wage model shows that power-biased
technical change in this sense may generate rising wage inequality accompanied by
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served increase in e¤ort.
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1 Introduction
Earnings inequality in the United States and other liberal market economies rose con-
siderably from the late 1970s through the early 1990s (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997).
Explanations for this change include institutional change (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux
1996), increased openness to trade (Leamer 1996) , and technological change (Berman,
Bound, and Machin 1998). This paper is about how to understand the contribution of
technological change, and in particular the adoption of new information and communica-
tions technologies (ICTs).
In the economics literature, the contribution of new technology to earnings inequality
has most often been explained in terms of the supply and demand for skill, under the
heading skill-biased technological change (SBTC). An alternate hypothesis locates the
connection in a change in the parameters of agency problems within the rm. We explore
the latter hypothesis with the aid of an e¢ ciency wage model. In such models, earnings
are determined by a combination of market conditions and the employees ability to a¤ect
the employers outcomes through a choice of actions, or e¤ort. Viewing this ability as a
form of power, we shall refer to this alternate explanation for increased earnings inequality
as power-biased technological change (PBTC) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section Two we review the prob-
lem of distinguishing, empirically, between SBTC and PBTC. Section Three presents an
e¢ ciency wage model in which we show that the power bias hypothesis is consistent not
only with reduced earnings for the less skilled, but also increased work e¤ort and reduced
employment. Section Four considers the policy implications. Section Five concludes.
2 Distinguishing skill bias and power bias.
When employers adopt new technologies, jobs change in various ways. We want to distin-
guish between two sorts of change, changes in skill requirements and changes in employee
power, as dened above. All jobs entail some power: an investment banker makes in-
vestments which may make or lose millions for the bank, and a burger ipper can burn
a few batches of burgers; the di¤erence in degree is important, but in both cases there is
an agency problem with which the employer must reckon. Among the factors which de-
termine the employees power are the extent of the assets or operations concerning which
the employee makes decisions; the quality and timeliness of the employers information
about the employees actions; and the quality and timeliness of the employers informa-
tion about the situation in which the employee acts (the state of nature). Each of these
parameters of employee power will be a¤ected by changes in ICT, either through direct
application of the technology (e.g., monitoring), or through ICT-facilitated changes in jobs
and organization structure.
The adoption of new technologies can also a¤ect the demand for skills, increasing
demand for some skills and reducing the demand for other skills, or for less-skilled labor.
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It is commonly argued that new technologies have been skill-biased in this sense. SBTC
combined with a lag in the adjustment of the skill supply (or a simple failure of the skill
supply to adjust) can lead to a rise in earnings inequality. By analogy, we apply the term
power-biased technological change (PBTC) to a situation in which changes in technology
lead to changes in workplace power. Technological changes that generate a general shift in
the power of all workers vis-a-vis rms represent a kind of power bias and we shall consider
this scenario briey in Section 4. But the main focus in this paper is on changes in the
relative power of di¤erent groups of workers and especially on technological changes that
increase the power of high-paid workers and reduce that of low-paid workers. A priori, of
course, it is not obvious that ICT must involve a power (or skill) bias that favors relatively
powerful (high-skilled) workers, but this case is the relevant one for an explanation of the
observed increase in inequality.
In terms of formal models of earnings determination, the distinction between skill and
power is clear: for skill, we have straightforward models of supply and demand equilibrium
in the market for human capital; for power, we have a variety of principal-agent models.
Yet the two have often been conated. For instance, Braverman (1974) depicts de-skilling
as a process driven by the employers objective of dis-empowering employees, with the
aim of paying them less. Yet de-skilled employees can became powerful, as the history
of industrial unions testies; and skilled employees are not necessarily powerful, as the
experience of countless cooks, musicians, garment makers and horticulturalists shows.
Power on the job is correlated with skill other things equal, when the employer has a
choice, more consequential discretion will be given to employees who know well what they
are doing, than to those who do not but it is not the same as skill, and factors other
than skill are involved in the determination of power.
Empirical studies of the causes of inequality have a di¢ cult time distinguishing skill
from power, not just because of the possible conceptual conation but because of inad-
equate data. Measurements of either property are at best incomplete, and are more often
indirect. Sometimes the proxies used are equally well proxies for skill and power. After
a number of studies proxying skill with the use of a computer at work had found that
ICT-related skills led to higher pay (see Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998, and references
therein), DiNardo and Pischke (1997) found that German workers received similar pay
premiums for using computers and for using pencils; they also got paid more for sitting
rather than standing. DiNardo and Pischke do not leave us believing that we know what
causes pay di¤erentials, but the fortuitous inclusion of pencils alongside computers in
their data does tell us something of the limits of our knowledge. Or consider the evidence
presented by Entorf and Kramarz (1997). Using longitudinal data on individual earnings,
technology and the amount of discretion a¤orded employees in a broad sample of French
companies, they nd an earnings premium for the use of new technology, but only if the
job allows signicant discretion. This is consistent with a power interpretation, but we
lack direct information on skill di¤erences.
Most of the sector or industry-specic research on earnings di¤erentials has dealt with
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manufacturing, which is better documented and, historically, more trade-sensitive. There
are, however, a number of studies of the e¤ect of ICTs on the labor process in growing in-
dustries such as retailing, banking, telecommunications and customer service call centers.
These studies provide evidence for the view that a widening of workplace power di¤erences
following the adoption of ICTs is quite common, if by no means universal. Signicant pop-
ulations of lower-paid workers face increased monitoring, more precise task specication,
and reduced opportunity for promotion, while managers face more consequential choices as
a result of increased organizational exibility. To the extent these studies deal with skill,
however, skill di¤erentials appear to be widening, too, so again the results are suggestive,
but not decisive (Grimshaw et al. 2002; Grimshaw et al. 2001; Miozzo and Ramirez 2003;
Batt 2001; Sewell 1998; Hunter and Lafkas 2003).
Why it is so di¢ cult to sort out the power and skill e¤ects can be seen clearly if we
consider some particular cases. We might be able to nd a few pure cases of power or
skill change. For instance, if so many electric typewriters with correction ribbons replace
so many manual ones, there is a change in capital-skill complementarity (because the new
capital is more forgiving of mistakes, the marginal product of typing skill is less), but no
change in power that we can think of. Or, consider the case of truck drivers: prior to
the 1980s a truck drivers employer usually had only a vague idea of where the driver and
truck were. Now the location of the truck, and even the behavior of its engine, are often
tracked by satellite. The skills required of the driver have not changed, but his scope for
taking advantage of possible slack in his schedule is diminished, and the employer has new
information with which to remove slack from the schedule over time. In this case, there
is no change in capital-skill complementarity, but there is a change in power.
Such pure cases are, however, exceptional. More often, there are good reasons to
believe that technological change a¤ects both the skill requirements of a job, and the
power associated with the job. For instance:
(1) Bar-code scanners in retailing. For roughly a century, from the 1880s to the 1980s,
a cash register kept track of the total amount of money the operator had taken in from
customers, and were able to subtotal this by department within the store. As a technology
of control, the cash register had the following limitation: while it helped to ensure that
the cash collected from customers was the same as the cash delivered by the cashier to the
employers, it could not prevent cashiers from under-charging favored customers (friends,
relatives), a phenomenon which was euphemistically referred to in the retail trade as
under-ringing. E¢ cient operation of the cash register also required certain motor and
cognitive skills.
With the introduction of bar code scanners, both the power and the skill requirements
of being a retail cashier changed simultaneously: under-ringing became far more di¢ cult,
and the skills required to operate a cash register became considerably less.
(2) High involvement work practices (HIWPs), such as self-managed teams, employee
involvement in decisions, multi-skilling of workers, and attening of hierarchies. Like Bres-
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nahan (1999), we regard the spread of HIWPs as a consequence of technological change.
One reason for this is that HIWPs are facilitated by modern ICTs. Another is that
HIWPs are part of a strategy of output exibility and responsiveness to customers which
is itself made possible by exible production technologies. Whatever the reasons, techno-
logical change and the adoption of HIWPs appear to be complements (Piva, Santarelli,
and Vivarelli 2005).
The evidence on whether HIWPs lead to higher pay is mixed, but on the whole it favors
the proposition that they do so. In recent multi-industry studies, Forth and Millward
(2004) nd that they do raise pay in the UK, while Handel and Gittleman (2004) conclude
that they do not in the US. We have reason to doubt Handel and Gittlemans interpretation
of their results, however: they actually report substantively, and sometimes statistically,
signicant estimates of higher wages associated with some particular HIWPs; this despite
the fact that the pooling of dissimilar industries and errors in the measurement of the use
of work practices both bias their estimates toward zero. Hunter and Lafkas (2003) avoid
much of this bias by studying a particular US industry (banking), and do nd a positive
association between HIWPs and employee earnings. Guy (2003) examines reasons for a
positive relationship between HIWPs and earnings in supermarkets.
HIWPs may involve changes in both skill and power. Teamwork, for instance, is an
area in which demand for skill and employee power are hard to distinguish. In many
workplaces, workers who once had narrowly dened individual jobs now do all or part of
their work in teams; a worker may be expected to do a number of di¤erent jobs within the
team, and some teams are assigned problem-solving or decision-making responsibilities
which were not previously within the remit of employees at their level. Such teamwork
may enhance the scope of action open to a worker, both because of the broadening of tasks
(e.g., problem solving), and what may be the greater di¢ culty of assigning individual
accountability when actions are taken by teams. On the other hand, improvements to
the employers information systems may o¤set this empowerment: improved planning and
monitoring may reduce the scope of employee decisions.
Skill requirements may also increase for workers involved in HIWPs, partly because
of multiple-skill requirements, and partly because teamwork is said to require particular
social skills (Bresnahan 1999; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002). What are labeled
social skills, however, can also be viewed as propensities to behave in certain ways. Such
propensities, or personality traits, may (like skills) be a product of the education system,
and are an attribute which employees bring with them to jobs (Bowles and Gintis 1976).
But propensities are not skills, and if these particular social propensities have become
more important to employers, this suggests that a failure to behave in line with such
propensities would now be more costly to an employer than it would have been before;
if this is so, then the increased importance of social skillsor personality characteristics
may be an indication of increased employee power.
(3) Changes in managerial work. The de-layering of organizations and the compet-
itive need for organizations to be exible give the remaining managers a greater range
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of decisions to make. On the other hand, managers get monitored, too. It is tempting,
especially for those of us trained to recognize the beauty of markets as examples of spon-
taneous, un-regimented order, to associate delegation, de-layering and decentralization as
marketization, the sunset of central control. But within organizations, decentralization
is typically facilitated by improved controls. For instance, the invention of the multi-
divisional corporation in the 1920s was made possible by improved cost accounting and
management by numbers(Chandler 1962, Auerbach 1988). The change in the power of
individual managers is therefore indeterminate. And, of course, organizational exibility
may increase the demand for skill among managers.
On the whole, then, distinguishing between the e¤ects of skill-bias and those of power-
bias is not straightforward. Even ndings in the research on earnings inequality which
seem to favor either skill-bias or power-bias can be less clear-cut than may rst appear.
The simultaneous increase in the relative wage and the relative employment of high-skill
workers, for instance, is an important piece of evidence for the SBTC explanation (Berman,
Bound, and Griliches 1994; Berman, Bound, and Machin 1998; Davis and Haltiwanger
1991), but our formalization in section 3 shows that a power bias may also account for
this evidence.
The exploration of PBTC in this paper is related to recent work by Green (2001, 2004).
Green shows that levels of e¤ort at work in UK rms increased during the 1990s, and a
larger body of research (also reviewed by Green 2004) supports this nding of increased
e¤ort in the UK, and probably in other industrial economies, during the 1980s and 1990s.
The standard SBTC approach sheds little light on these ndings. Based on his econometric
results, however, Green attributes a large part of the rise in e¤ort to technological changes.
These changes, he argues, may have improved the capacity of managers to monitor e¤ort
and / or, as a second channel, they may have been "e¤ort-biased", that is, they may have
generated e¢ ciency gains associated with better control of work ows, and these gains
increased the marginal productivity of e¤ort (Green 2004, p. 714). Both of the channels
identied by Green can be seen as examples of technology a¤ecting employee power (for a
given level of monitoring, a change in the marginal product of e¤ort changes the employees
ability to a¤ect employer outcomes).1 Green does not, however, consider the di¤erential
e¤ects of technological change on wage inequality and the relative e¤ort of di¤erent groups
of workers. Moreover, he eschews formal modeling, suggesting (quite rightly) that there
is a multiplicity of possible explanations of increased e¤ort and that these "explanations
operate in a range contexts (including competitive, bilateral bargaining and e¢ ciency wage
models)" (Green 2004, p. 712). But general reduced-form relations also have obvious
drawbacks. Our aim in this paper is to examine a particular case of PBTC - improved
monitoring of lower paid workers - and its implications, and for this purpose a formal
model is needed.2
1Greens (2004) study also explores various other possible inducements to greater e¤ort.
2 It should be noted that while "e¤ort-biased technical change" is consistent with the PBTC model
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3 A formal model of power-biased technical change
We use a standard e¢ ciency wage framework to analyze the e¤ects PBTC, and to keep
the analysis simple consider an economy with only two types of workers. We assume that
there is no heterogeneity among workers of a given type and that employed workers always
hold jobs that match their type.3. It may be reasonable to suppose that the two types
of workers are dened by their di¤erent skills, but from a technical perspective the key
assumption is just the separation of workers into two distinct pools, each with its own
unemployment rate. All rms are identical and, disregarding non-labor inputs, output of
the representative rm is given by
Y = AF (eHNH ; eLNL)
where ei and Ni denote e¤ort and employment of type i workers, i = H;L (H =high
power, L =low power). Our concern in this paper is with the e¤ect of changes in the
ability of rms to a¤ect employee power in one particular way, which is to monitor e¤ort.
In order to focus on this aspect of the problem we assume complete symmetry between
the two groups of workers, except for di¤erences in the monitoring of the two groups. One
aspect of the symmetry assumption is that of neutral technical change, that is, we assume
while the productivity parameter Amay change, the F function remains unchanged. This
denition of Hicks-neutrality when e¤ort is endogenous is discussed further in Appendix
A.
Workerschoice of e¤ort is determined by the cost of job loss and the sensitivity of the
risk of job loss to variations in e¤ort.4 As a formal specication, we assume that if a rm
pays the wage wi; the e¤ort of its type-i workers may be determined by the maximization
of the objective function V i,5
V i = pi(ei)[wi   v(ei)  hi( wi; b; ui)] (1)
where wi;ui and b denote the average wage, the unemployment rate and the rate of unem-
ployment benets. Arguably the choice of e¤ort should be determined by an optimization
problem that is explicitly intertemporal but as shown in Appendix B, a simple intertem-
poral optimization model reduces to a special case of problem (1).
(which assumes an incomplete contract for e¤ort), it is also consistent with a model of complete contracts
and an unequal distribution of the ability or willingness to work at a high level of e¤ort.
3A signicant amount of evidence suggests that this assumption may be misleading. Skott (2005, 2006)
and Skott and Auerbach (2005) analyse alternative models in which unemployed high-skill workers may
accept low-skill jobs. We shall return to this issue in Section Four.
4Most expositions of e¢ ciency wage models emphasize the former e¤ect, with the risk of job loss and
its dependence on e¤ort taken as exogenous; exceptions include Bowles (1985) and Gintis and Ishikawa
(1987).
5We use subscripts (i = H;L) for variables but superscripts for functions since, in accordance with
standard practice, subscripts denote partial derivatives in the case of functions.
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The function v(ei) describes the disutility associated with e¤ort, and the function
pi(ei) captures the e¤ect of e¤ort on the expected remaining duration of the job; since
an increase in e¤ort raises the disutility of e¤ort and reduces the risk of being red, we
have v0 > 0; pi0 > 0. By assumption there is symmetry between the two groups, except for
power di¤erences, and the v function is therefore the same for both groups of workers.
The function hi( wi; b; ui) represents the fallback position, that is, the expected utility in
case of job loss; the partial derivatives satisfy hiw > 0; h
i
b > 0 and h
i
u < 0 under all standard
assumptions.
The rst order condition for the workers maximization problem can be written
 piv0 + (wi   v   hi)pi0 = 0 (2)
and we may write the solution to the problem as
ei = f
i(wi; wi; b; ui) (3)
The sign of the partial f iw must be positive at any wage (above the minimum) chosen by
a prot maximizing rm and, using the second order condition in combination with the
partials for hi; it is straightforward to show that f iw < 0; f
i
b < 0; f
i
u > 0.
Now introduce the e¤ect of technical change on rmsability to monitor e¤ort. This
change may be represented by a shift in the pi function. The key property of this shift
is that it a¤ects the sensitivity of the ring rate to variations in e¤ort. Thus, we assume
that
pi0
pi
= (ei; i) (4)
where the parameter i describes monitoring ability and  > 0. An improvement in
rmsability to monitor the e¤orts of individual workers makes the expected job duration
of any individual worker more sensitive to changes in the workers own e¤ort. Equation
(4) expresses this assumption. It should be noted, however, that the equation says nothing
about the average ring rate and, as explained in appendix B, the average ring rate may
be una¤ected by a change in i.
Totally di¤erentiating the rst order condition (2) and using (4) we get
ei =
@ei
@i
=  
i

ie
> 0
where i =  piv0+(wi v hi)pi0 = pi[ v0+(wi v hi)]: Using the rst order condition,
we have i = p
i(wi  v hi)+pi[ v0+(wi  v hi)] = pi(wi  v hi) > 0; and the
sign of ei now follows from the second-order condition which implies that ie is negative.
Intuitively, if the cost of job loss is positive and the expected job duration becomes more
sensitive to variations in e¤ort, the optimal response is to raise e¤ort.
The wage is set by the rm. The standard rst order conditions imply that
eiwwi
ei
= 1 (5)
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and, using (3)-(5), the solutions for wage and e¤ort can be expressed6
wi = wi( wi; ui;i)
ei = ei( wi; ui;i)
In equilibrium, wi = wi and
wi = wi(ui;i); i = H;L (6)
ei = ei(ui;i); i = H;L (7)
Combining equations (6)-(7) with rmsrst order conditions with respect to employ-
ment, we get
wi = eiAFi(eLNL; eHNH) (8)
Using the denitional relations between unemployment ui and employment Ni, equations
(6)-(8) yield equilibrium solutions for the endogenous variables (wi; ei; Ni) as functions of
the parameters A and i that describe the technology:
Ni = Ni(A;i; j); wi = wi(Ni; i) = wi(A;i; j); ei = ei(Ni; i) = ei(A;i; j)
where i = H;L; j = H;L; i 6= j:
Denite conclusions concerning the e¤ects of a changes in power (changes in the para-
meters i) can be obtained if functional forms for the h ; p  and v functions are intro-
duced. We assume that the p  and v functions satisfy
pi0
pi
= (ei; i) =
i
ei
(9)
v(ei) = e

i ;  > 1 (10)
The specication of the semi-elasticity of the pi function in (9) can be seen as a log-linear
approximation of the pi function around the equilibrium solution for ei.7 Equation (10)
is standard, the parameter restriction  > 1 implying that given the chosen scale of e¤ort,
the disutility of e¤ort is strictly convex.8 This convexity assumption ensures that the
rms unit cost does not decrease monotonically as wages increase and that, therefore, an
equilibrium solution for w exists.
6Unemployment benets are taking to be constant throughout the analysis, and the variable b is there-
fore omitted from the expressions.
7 Integration of (9) implies that
pi(ei) = Ke
i
i
where K is an arbitrary constant. The intertemporal interpretation in Appendix B of workersmaximisa-
tion problem implies that pi(ei) is bounded, unlike the above expression. Thus, the approximation will be
bad for largevalues of ei. It may be good, however, for e¤ort levels in the relevant range, and all our
simulations below yield modest variations in e¤ort.
8E¤ort is ordinal and the convexity assumption is conditional on the chosen scale. This scale is determ-
ined implicitly by the specication of the production function (Katzner and Skott (2004)).
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The specication (9)-(10) implies that (6)-(7) take the following form (see Appendix
C)
ei =

i
i + 
1
   1hi
1=
(11)
wi =

   1hi (12)
With respect to the fallback position, nally, we use the specic functional form obtained
from the optimization model in Appendix B:
hi =
(r + )ui
rui + 
b+
(1  ui)
rui + 
( wi   v(ei)) (13)
where ei is determined by setting wi = wi in equation (3); r and  are the discount
rate and the rate of job separations, respectively. The symmetry assumption implies that
both groups have the same discount rate, and the average rate of separations may be
also the same for both groups even if their power and e¤ort levels di¤er (see Appendix
B). Intuitively, the fallback position is a weighted average of the utility when unemployed
(b) and in an alternative job ( wi   v(ei)_): The weights depend on ui since (in a steady
state) the unemployment rate is equal to the proportion of time one can be expect to
unemployed; if there is no discounting (r = 0) the weights are simply ui and 1   ui but
when r > 0; unemployment (the initial state in case of job loss) is weighted more heavily.
Turning to the demand for labor, we assume a symmetric CES production function,
Y = A[0:5(eLNL)
  + 0:5(eHNH) ] 1=
where  = 1=(1 + ) is the elasticity of substitution. This specication implies that
equations (8) can be written
wi = A[0:5(eLNL)
  + 0:5(eHNH) ] (1+)=(0:5)e
 
i N
 (1+)
i
= 0:5 1=Aei[1 + (
ejNj
eiNi
) ] (1+)= (14)
With symmetric and inelastic labor supplies (normalized at unity), nally, we have
ui = 1 Ni (15)
The solutions for (eL; wL; NL; eH ; wH ; NH) can be derived using (11)-(15). Not surpris-
ingly, the fully symmetric case with L = H produces a symmetric solution for e¤ort,
wages and employment: (eL; wL; NL) = (eH ; wH ; NH):
In order to analyse the implications of power-biased change in monitoring technology
we now introduce a decline in the power of low-power workers (a rise in L) and / or an
increase in the power of high-power workers (a fall in H): Consider a rise in L. Intuitively,
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this rise puts upward pressure on eL (equation (11)) and thus, for a given value of NL; on
the e¤ective labor input eLNL. For a given ratio of relative labor inputs, (eLNL)=(eHNH);
a rise in eL will increase the wage wL (equation (14)), but wL is a¤ected negatively if the
upwards pressure on eLNL generates a rise in the input ratio (eLNL)=(eHNH) (equation
(14)). This negative e¤ect is stronger the larger is ; that is, the lower the elasticity of
substitution. Strong complementarity between the inputs also implies that any rise in eL
tends to a¤ect NL negatively (since the complementary demand for eHNH following a rise
in eLNL raises high-power wages). Thus, the elasticity of substitution plays a critical role
for the e¤ects of a change in relative power.
It is readily seen that if the two types of workers are perfect substitutes ( =  1);
both the wage wL and employment NL must increase following a rise in L (see Appendix
D). But perfect substitution is an extreme case. We know of no attempts to examine the
elasticity of substitution between groups with di¤erent workplace power. As argued in
Section Two, however, power and skill may be strongly correlated, and the estimates of
the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent skill categories presented by Card, Kramarz
and Lemieux (1999) are all very low. Thus, the empirically interesting case is likely to be
one in which the elasticity of substitution is below unity, that is, 0  . The implications
of changes in L are explored in Table 1 for di¤erent, non-negative values of ; Table
1a assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function ( = 0) while Tables 1b-1d introduce
complementarity ( = 1;  = 4 and  = 10, respectively). The variations in L are within
(what we consider) its plausible range. The intertemporal interpretation in Appendix
B implies that p = 1=(r + ) and hence that p0=p =   1r+ dde =   r+ 1e d log d log e where  is
the rate of job separations. Job separations happen for a range of reasons (including
voluntary quits and plant closures), and it seems unlikely that  d log d log e should exceed unity
(this statement is meaningful since the chosen scale for e¤ort implies that productivity is
proportional to e¤ort). It follows that  will be less than one. Thus, we focus on the range
0  L  1. With respect to the other parameters of the model, we use a discount rate of
r = 0:05 and a rate of separations of  = 0:2 (implying that just over 18% of workers will
lose, or choose to leave, their jobs within one period). The rate of unemployment benets
is normalized at one, b = 1; the productivity parameter is A = 10, and the (inverse)
indicator of the power of high-power workers is H = 0:1: The parameter  in the utility
function, nally, must be greater then one (cf above), and the qualitative results appear
to be insensitive to the precise value. The tables use  = 5.
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Table 1: E¤ects a decline in the power of L-workers
on e¤ort, wage and unemployment
1a: Cobb-Douglas,  = 0
L eL wL uL hL xL eH wH uH hH xH
0:1 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73
0:5 0:63 5:35 0:19 4:28 4:47 0:46 5:42 0:20 4:34 4:56
1:0 0:72 5:73 0:18 4:58 4:78 0:47 5:90 0:20 4:72 4:95
1b: Weak complementarity,  = 1
L eL wL uL hL xL eH wH uH hH xH
0:1 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73
0:5 0:61 4:65 0:20 3:72 3:89 0:47 6:00 0:20 4:80 5:03
1:0 0:69 4:63 0:19 3:70 3:86 0:48 6:73 0:19 5:38 5:65
1c: Strong complementarity,  = 4
L eL wL uL hL xL eH wH uH hH xH
0:1 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73
0:5 0:58 3:68 0:22 2:95 3:08 0:48 6:76 0:19 5:40 5:67
1:0 0:64 3:24 0:21 2:59 2:70 0:50 7:71 0:19 6:16 6:47
1d: Very strong complementarity,  = 10
L eL wL uL hL xL eH wH uH hH xH
0:1 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73 0:45 4:45 0:21 3:56 3:73
0:5 0:56 3:12 0:23 2:50 2:61 0:49 7:18 0:19 5:74 6:02
1:0 0:61 2:55 0:25 2:04 2:12 0:50 8:11 0:19 6:49 6:81
As indicated in Table 1, a decrease in the power of the low-power workers benets
the high-power workers in terms of both wages and employment. Their e¤ort also goes
up but the net welfare e¤ect can be calculated if one accepts the assumptions underlying
the intertemporal optimization in Appendix B. Given these assumptions, the welfare of
unemployed and employed workers can be measured by h(= rU) and x = (w   e) rr+ +
h r+ (= rV ), respectively.
9 For high-power workers, the overall e¤ect is an increase in
both hH and xH for all values of .
Low-power workers also benet from an erosion in their own power if the production
function is Cobb-Douglas and the power of high-power workers is unchanged. Low-power
workers increase e¤ort but employment and wages improve, and both hL and xL increase.
Thus, the net benets are unambiguously positive. This result may seem counter-intuitive
at rst sight but the explanation is straightforward. Agency problems lead to outcomes
9The values of hi are proportional to wi (cf. equation (12)). Separate hi columns are included in the
table to facilitate a comparison between the welfare measures for employed and unemployed workers.
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that are Pareto suboptimal, and the increased ability of rms to monitor e¤ort reduces
the agency problem. Taking into account the derived e¤ects on employment and wages,
workers may therefore in some cases benet from a decline in their workplace power.
Table 2 presents a case in which the improved monitoring of one group of workers is
combined with reduced monitoring of the other group. This case does not produce the
same alleviation of the overall agency problem and, as a result, the loss of power generates
a decrease in welfare for the low-power group.
Table 2: E¤ects of PBTC on e¤ort, wage and unemployment
in the Cobb-Douglas case when the rise in L is combined with a fall in H .
L H eL wL uL hL xL eH wH uH hH xH
0:5 0:5 0:65 6:53 0:18 5:22 5:46 0:65 6:53 0:18 5:22 5:46
0:8 0:3 0:71 6:43 0:18 5:15 5:37 0:59 6:54 0:19 5:23 5:47
Returning to the case in which H remains unchanged, Tables 1b-1d show how the
improvements in employment and wages are eroded as the degree of complementarity in
production increases. With weak complementarity ( = 1;  = 0:5) the wage as well as the
utility variables hL and xL move non-monotonically as the power indicator L changes.
When  = 4, unemployment changes non-monotonivally but both the wage and the welfare
measures hL and xL fall as L increases. In the case with very strong complementarity
( = 10 and   0:9) conditions deteriorate along all three dimensions, and the welfare
measures hL and xL decline strongly when L increases.
This simple model can yield outcomes that are broadly in line with US and UK exper-
ience. Consider for instance, an increase in L from 0.5 to 1. If  = 1, perhaps the most
plausible estimate, e¤ort (=productivity) increases by about 10 percent for the low paid
workers, their real wage declines slightly, their relative wage falls by about 12 percent, and
the relative unemployment rates remain roughly unchanged. One should not, of course,
read too much into this broad congruence with empirical observations. We certainly do
not claim that the model (and PBTC, more generally) provides an adequate explanation
of the movements in wage inequality. The results of the simulations do show, however,
that the e¤ects of PBTC can be quantitatively important.
4 Implications
If technological changes lie behind the observed movements in wage inequality, does it
matter whether the technical change is skill biased or power biased? The answer is yes.
Greater precision, rst, is always desirable. The SBTC hypothesis arguably has often been
presented in a rather vague manner, and empirically it has been di¢ cult to identify the
critical changes in skill requirements. If nothing else, the distinction between PBTC and
SBTC may help to clarify some aspects of the changes that have been taking place in the
labor market.
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The source of the bias, second, may have implications for the welfare analysis of techno-
logical change. Skill biases may produce both winners and losers but there is a presumption
of net gains in the sense that under SBTC the gains of the winners would be su¢ cient,
in principle, to compensate the losers. There is no basis for this presumption in the case
of power bias. A new technique can be protable and may be adopted even if it is less
e¢ cient than existing techniques.10 This point can be illustrated by a simple variation
on the analysis in Section Three. In Section Three we allowed for two types of labor, but
price taking behavior in the product market and constant returns to labor eliminated all
prots. We now abandon the assumption of constant returns to labor and, to simplify the
presentation, assume homogeneous labor. Let the production function be
Y = A(0:5K  + 0:5(eN) ) 1= (16)
where the non-labor input K is taken to be constant, and assume that workplace e¤ort
is determined as in Section Three. Using the specic functional forms in (11)-(13) - but
without subscripts since there is only one kind of worker - the e¤ects of changes in 
and the productivity parameter A can be calculated. An example is given in Table 3.11
The rise in  leads to an improvement in both wages and employment if A is unchanged.
The interesting aspect of Table 3, however, is that when the rise in  from 0.1 to 0.5 is
combined with a very substantial loss of technical e¢ ciency (a 25 percent fall in A from 10
to 7.5) prots  still increase while workers su¤er a large reduction in wages and welfare.
The negative e¤ect on prots of lower technical e¢ ciency is more than compensated for
by the decrease in workerspower and the associated changes in e¤ort and wages.12
Table 3: E¤ects of changes in monitoring
A  e w u h x 
10 0:1 0:45 4:91 0:21 3:93 4:12 1:40
10 0:5 0:63 5:53 0:19 4:42 4:62 2:29
7:5 0:5 0:60 4:12 0:21 3:29 3:47 1:54
Third, the source of the bias, may be important for an understanding of the diversity
within the group of OECD countries. We have analysed the PBTC hypothesis using a
traditional e¢ ciency wage model as it applies to individual wage determination. This
10A Marx-inspired literature has analysed this issue, e.g. Marglin (1974) and Bowles (1985).
11The table uses  = 1: The other parameters are  = 5; r = 0:05;  = 0:2;K = 1 and b = 1.
12The choice of  is not necessarily a zero sum game, with any gains to rms coming at the expense of
workers. In the Cobb-Douglas case in Table 1a, workers benetted from a reduction in their workplace
power and in this case too, a Cobb-Douglas specication of (16) may do the trick: assuming prot max-
imization and perfect competition in the product market, prots are a constant share of output, and it
follows that if technological change (a shift in A and/or ) generates an increase in prots then aggregate
wages must also go up.
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model, arguably, provides a good approximation of wage setting in the US, UK, and
other liberal market economies (using the term in the sense employed by Hall and Soskice
(2001)), but it may be less appropriate for countries in which wage bargains are more
likely to be collective. Unions, moreover, inuence working conditions as well as wages.
Thus, there is evidence that the presence of strong unions reduces the impact of the cost
of job loss on e¤ort (Green and McIntosh, 1998), and among European countries there is
a correlation between loss of union power and the rate of work intensication (Green and
McIntosh, 2001). It is interesting to note, therefore, that there are pronounced di¤erences
with respect to both levels of and changes in wage inequality between the liberal market
economies and economies in which collective bargaining over wages plays an important
role
Wallerstein (1999) nds that most of the variance in inequality in 16 OECD countries
between 1980 and 1992 is explained by di¤erences in the degree of the centralization
(with centralization increasing from individual to plant to industry to nation) of wage
bargaining, together with the extent of collective bargaining coverage. However, most of
the variation in Wallersteins data is cross sectional. Only three of his countries show large
changes in wage inequality over the period studied; in 1992 those three (the US, Canada,
and the UK) had the rst, second and fourth highest levels of wage inequality among the
16 studied. If we attribute changes in inequality to technological change, and assuming
that the countries had access to the same technologies at the same time, then among the
rich countries technological change raised wage overall inequality only where individual
wage bargaining was the norm.
That much is true whether the link between technology and earnings is skill or power,
but the implications are di¤erent. Under the SBTC hypothesis (and also the trade hy-
pothesis, not considered here), the centrally bargained compression of wage di¤erences
generates unemployment and, in the longer run investment in human capital will eventu-
ally reduce inequality in the liberal economies, while the more centralized ones will su¤er
high unemployment until they accept a greater measure of inequality.13 On the other
hand, if the PBTC hypothesis is true, the compression of wage di¤erences may carry no
such penalties. To see this, note that in the - admittedly extreme - case in which e¤ort
levels are set and controlled by unions there are no agency problems between rms and
workers: from a single rms perspective, e¤ort is exogenously given. Having e¤ort levels
exogenously determined, moreover, does not block technological progress; it merely weeds
out those changes of technique that are protable only because of work intensication.
13 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the empirical evidence in any detail but the association
between low earnings inequality and high unemployment is weak: Norway and Sweden, for instance, have
not su¤ered high unemployment during the relevant period, the recovery during the 1990s from high
unemployment in the 1980s was as strong in Denmark as in the UK, and the employment rate among
low-skill men fell more in the US than in Germany between 1970 and 1990. We may note also that skill
levels of unemployed Germans are high enough to cast doubt on the SBTC explanation for their lack of
jobs (Freeman and Schettkat 2001) and that European countries with high unemployment had signicant
increases in high-skill as well as low-skill unemployment (Nickell and Bell 1996).
14
Overall then, PBTC suggests an institutional solution to what may otherwise be an
ongoing state of high earnings inequality in the liberal market economies, and although
any solution involving centralized wage bargaining might seem fanciful in the US and UK
today, there is a case for the view that the power of unions in both countries has followed
a long-wave pattern in the past (Fairris 1997; Kelly 1998).
In the SBTC case, a better provision of skills has been the standard suggestion for
reducing income inequality. Since the standard e¢ ciency wage model does not negate the
link between changes in the relative labor supply and relative wages, it should also be
possible to reverse a PBTC-induced rise in inequality through education and training if,
as argued in Section Two, high-skill jobs tend to be associated with high power. Indeed,
assuming that workers are always matched to jobs of their type, it is straightforward
to show that in the model of Section Three, an increase in the relative supply of high-
power workers will reduce inequality. The presence of overeducation, however, calls into
question the e¢ cacy of the education and training response to rising inequality. High-skill
workers may ll low-skill jobs, and there is strong evidence that this kind of mismatch
is widespread. The presence of overeducation can be explained within an e¢ ciency-wage
framework, and simple simulations of a model of this kind show that the e¤ects of changes
in the composition of the labor force can have very weak or even paradoxical e¤ects on
relative wages: an increase in the relative supply of high-skill workers forces more high-
skill workers into low-skill jobs, this hurts the employment prospects of low-skill workers,
and in extreme cases the skill premium may even increase (Skott 2006).14
5 Conclusion
The application of new technologies in the workplaces may change skill requirements but
it also changes the relative power of di¤erent employees. Either sort of change might be
distributed across jobs in a way that does not a¤ect the aggregate earnings distribution,
or alternatively might be distributed in a way that generates overall changes in the level
of inequality.
The US and the UK along with some (but by no means all) other countries have
experienced an increase in earnings inequality. This increase has been explained in terms
of increased returns to skill, but the fact that more skilled employees are assigned to better
paying jobs does not demonstrate that it is only the skill that is being compensated. The
empirical evidence does not allow a clear test of the relative importance of power and
skill biases for the movements in relative wages. Our reading of the evidence, however,
suggests that the more important changes associated with new technology may relate to
power rather than skill. ICTs have reduced the scope for consequential decision making by
lower-paid employees, and increased that for higher-paid employees. Since the lower-paid
14The presence of overeducation also implies that relative unemployment rates may be insensitive to
movements in relative wages arising from shifts in wage norms (Skott 2005).
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employees tend to have lower levels of measured skill, this increased di¤erential shows up
empirically as an increased return to skill within organizations.
Our formal model in this paper is limited to changes in monitoring, which is just one
avenue by which ICTs can a¤ect the workplace power of employees. It deals only with
individual e¤ort choices and wage bargains, abstracting from any form of collective action.
Within this limited territory, however, it demonstrates that changes in power relationships
(the PBTC hypothesis) can explain the simultaneous occurrence of lower wages, higher
unemployment and higher work e¤ort for the lower skilled; changes in the demand for
skills (SBTC) can explain the rst two of these but is silent on the third.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix A: E¤ort and technical change
Let "L and "H be verbal descriptions of work activities and assume that, for the worker,
di¤erent work activities are associated with di¤erent ows of utility.15 Let eL and eH be
orderings dened by
e0i = fi("
0
i)  fi("i) = ei if and only if u(c; "0i)  u(c; "i)
and assume that this ordering is independent of the level of consumption. Dene the set

i(x) = f"i j fi("i)  xg.
15See Katzner and Skott (2004) for an analysis of methodological problems surrounding the use of ordinal
variables like "e¤ort".
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Let the production function before technical change be given by
Y = G("L; NL; "H ; NH)
and assume that
max
"i2
i(ei)
G("L; NL; "H ; NH) = F (eLNL; eHNH)
Technical change is unbiased if, after the change, the new production function ~G("L; NL; "H ; NH)
satises
max
"i2
i(ei)
~G("L; NL; "H ; NH) = AF (eLNL; eHNH)
6.2 Appendix B: Intertemporal optimization
Consider an innitely lived agent with instantaneous utility function
u(c; e) = c  v(e)
Assume that the interest rate r is equal to the discount rate. The time prole of consump-
tion is then a matter of indi¤erence to the agent, and we may assume that consumption
matches current income. If U denotes the value function of an unemployed worker, a
worker who is currently employed at a wage w faces an optimization problem that can be
written
maxE
TZ
0
(w   v(e)) exp( rt) dt+ exp( rT ) U
where the stochastic variable T denotes the time that the worker loses the job. Assuming
a constant hazard rate, T is exponentially distributed. In a steady state the objective
function can be rewritten
E
TZ
0
(w   v(e)) exp( rt) dt+ exp( rT ) U = E
TZ
0
(w   v(e)  h) exp( rt) dt+ U
= E(
w   v(e)  h
r
(1  exp( rT )) + U
= (w   v(e)  h)p+ U
where h = rU and p = E(1  exp( rT ))=r = (1  r+ )=r = 1r+ is an increasing function
of the rate of separations . E¤ort a¤ects the ring probability and thus the rate of
separations, so the workers rst order condition can be written
 v0(e)p(e) + (w   v(e)  h)p0(e) = 0
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The value function for an unemployed worker will depend on the average level of wages, the
rate of unemployment benets and the hiring rate. With a constant rate of unemployment,
the hiring rate q is proportional to the average rate of separations
q = 
L
N   L =

1  u
u
where u is the unemployment rate and  is the average rate of separations. The risk of
job loss gives an incentive for workers to provide e¤ort. But an increased average ring
rate does not help the rm unless it raises e¤ort (on the contrary, high labor turnover is
usually costly). Since e¤ort is determined by the semi-elasticity p0=p (see the rst order
condition) it follows that the average ring rate in the economy need not be related to the
average level of e¤ort and, secondly, that an improved ability to detect individual e¤ort -
a rise in p0=p - may change the average (standard) e¤ort but need not be associated with
any changes in the ring rate for workers that meet this changed standard. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that  is constant. But since average e¤ort is itself determined by
w; b and u, whether or not  depends on e, we have
h = h( w; b; u)
In equilibrium, w = w and in order to nd the value of h we note that
V   U = (w   h  v(e))p (B1)
U   V = (b  rV )s = fb  r[(w   h  v(e))p+ h
r
]gs (B2)
where s = E(1 exp( rTu)r ) and the stochastic variable Tu denotes the remaining length
of the spell of unemployment of a currently unemployed worker. With a constant rate of
separations, random hiring and constant unemployment, the stochastic variable Tu follows
an exponential distribution with expected value ETu = u1 uET where ET = 1= is the
average expected remaining duration of employment for an employed worker. Using (B1)-
(B2) and the expressions for p and s (p = 1=(r + ); s = 1=(r + (1   u)=u))), it follows
that
h = (w   v(e)) p  rps
p+ s  rps + b
s
p+ s  rps
= (w   v(e))(1  u)
ru+ 
+ b
(r + )u
ru+ 
Thus, the fallback position is a weighted average of the utility ows while employed and
unemployed with the weights depending on the rate of unemployment.
6.3 Appendix C: Derivation of (11)-(12)
Using (9)-(10) and omitting the superscripts, the rst order condition (2) can be written
e 1 = (w   e   h)
e
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or
e = [

+ 
(w   h)]1= (C1)
It follows that
ew =
1

[ + (w   h)]1=
w   h
The rms rst order condition (5) yields
1

w
w   h = 1
or
w =

   1h (C2)
6.4 Appendix D: E¤ects of an increase in L when  =  1:
When  =  1; the production function is
Y = 0:5A(eLNL + eHNH)
and at an interior solution with 0 < uL < 1 we have
wL = 0:5AeL (D1)
Using (D1), (11)-(12) and (C2), it follows that
d logwL
d logL
=
d log eL
d logL
d log eL
d logL
=
1

 
d log( LL+
)
d logL
+
d logwL
d logL
!
Hence,
d logwL
d logL
=
d log eL
d logL
=
1
   1
d log( LL+
)
d logL
> 0
To show that NL must also rise, we note that - combining(11)-(13) - hL can be written
hL =
bf(uL)
 
( 1)(L+) + f(uL))[1 +

( 1)(L+) ]
where f(uL) =
(r+)uL
ruL+
and f 0 > 0. The value of hL is decreasing in both L and uL: Since
hL is proportional to wL and since wL increases following a rise in L, it follows that uL
must decrease.
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